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Preface
The concept of life has fascinated mankind through the ages. Theories on the 
origins of the human race, the nature, origin and end o f life, whether there is 
life after death, and how these different aspects interrelate, have been widely 
discussed over many centuries. In addition to what we learn in the Bible 
about the views of life of the Jews and early Christians, similar and different 
ideas about life — all valuable — are found in other religions. Philosophers 
have grappled with the complexities of the phenomenon and have given 
many answers to the various questions concerning life. Biologists have come 
up with the most interesting ideas and theories; so have medical scientists 
and many others to whom the concept of life presents tantalising secrets. 
These different views have given rise to a wide range of bioethical issues, 
which need to be addressed in terms of our current understanding of life.
The emergence of industry and the development of technology have opened 
up new challenges to humankind, and have changed our concept of life. 
Because of the discovery of the structure of DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid), 
modem genetic engineering, for example, has enabled scientists to modify 
genetic material, which has major implications for humankind and its envi­
ronment. Developments in reproductive technologies, such as in vitro fertili­
sation, embryo freezing and oocyte donation, have necessitated serious 
thought by medical scientists, philosophers, ethicists, theologians, jurists 
and others. These developments are part of our daily experience. At the same 
time we are reminded daily of other realities influencing our concept of life 
and raising questions about the right to life.
Malnutrition, poverty, power struggles, oppression, warfare, terrorism, 
the emergence of new and horrifying diseases such as AIDS, and many other 
things we experience, influence the way in which we construct reality and 
how we conceive of life. It is only by considering the challenging complexity 
of life that we can really start thinking about the right to life.
The concern of the organising committee o f the twelfth annual seminar of
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the Institute for Theological Research at Unisa was to offer a forum for those 
who are interested in the complexities of bioethics from a theological point of 
view. To this end we invited a number of speakers to prepare papers on a 
variety of topics about the right to life. To talk meaningfully about bioethics, 
one has to consider the question 'What is life?'. The answers to this question 
lead to ideas about the right to life. Being aware of the many possible 
answers to that question, we decided to invite speakers to tackle the question 
of the right to life from different angles. This book contains a selection of the 
papers delivered at the seminar. It addresses a small, but nevertheless 
important aspect of the problem and clearly indicates the complexity of the 
right to life and quality of life in our own time. The views expressed are those 
of the authors of the essays and not necessarily those of the Institute or the 
University.
I am indebted to many individuals who helped me with the preparation of 
the seminar and the book. The organising committee, consisting o f Jansie 
Kilian, Hilda Steyn, Klippies Kritzinger and Willie Wessels, was responsible 
for finding a topical issue, appropriate topics and knowledgeable speakers, 
and for organising the seminar. In this connection it gives me great pleasure 
to thank Professor J V van der Merwe, Dean of the Medical Faculty of the 
University of Pretoria, who has made it possible for us to have Dr Quigley of 
Cleveland, Ohio in the USA as one of our speakers.
I am also indebted to the authors of the essays contained in the book and to 
the referees who had to ensure academic quality. Deep appreciation is 
extended to Jansie Kilian, Hilda Steyn and Beverley van Reenen for their help 
in editing the book, and to those who assisted in proofreading the manu­
script: Almarie Blaauw, Adrian Blom and Ernst Horn. The manuscript was 
typed by Nonnie Fouche. My sincere thanks to all of you, including my 
secretary, Linda Bedingfield.
THE EDITOR
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A P DU TOIT What is 
life?
As a way of presenting possible answers to the question 'What is 
life?' I shall begin with two parables.
FIRST PARABLE
Scientists first produced life in the laboratory by physico­
chemical experimentation in the year 2010. A form of life had 
spontaneously come about. This breakthrough made it possible for 
the scientists to produce and cultivate a human being by physico­
chemical processes. They made a male human being and, by the 
time the boy was seven years old, scientific tests had shown that 
he was in all respects similar to any other human male. During 
this time scientists had also produced a substance which stopped 
the ageing process. If humans took it at the age of thirty 
years, for the sake of argument, they would to all outward 
appearances stay that age and not show any physical deterio­
ration. Scientists claimed that, by taking the substance regu­
larly, humans could live indefinitely.
Then the philosophers came along and said, 'Look, the boy created 
by the scientists may have to be distinguished from human beings 
born in the usual way. We could have a new mutation of the human 
species which also calls for new descriptions. For the time 
being we shall label this mutation a Category B human being. The 
human beings who take the substance that gives everlasting life 
may also be of a different category. We shall call them Category 
C humans, and by observation and argumentation we shall decide 
how to describe them and where they fit in. Clearly our concept 
of life will also change.' The philosophers went away to work on
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new descriptions, new theories and alter their concept of life.
The theologians came along and said, 'Look, the first thing we 
shall have to decide is whether the human male produced by the 
scientists has a soul, or not. And what does "soul" mean in this 
context? We may find that the soul has never existed, and that 
human beings born in the usual manner do not have souls, after 
all. It may even be necessary to drop the concept "soul" from 
the theological vocabulary. On the other hand, perhaps God has 
had a change of mind and now allows man to produce both life and 
souls.' The theologians went away to think about these matters 
and to contemplate the kind of contribution they could make in 
this changed world.
And the scientists and the philosophers and the theologians all 
started taking the substance that makes humans live indefinitely.
SECOND PARABLE
In the year 2010 mutations of the AIDS virus had become so 
prolific and contagious that 95% of the world's human population 
had been wiped out. Estimates showed that it would take three 
years for man to become extinct. The latest reports said that 
scientists were frantically preparing space ships to travel to 
the earth's moon and other planets, thus hoping to escape the 
deadly viruses. At that point in time there were no indications 
that conditions elsewhere in space could sustain human life and 
thus save the species.
The few remaining philosophers and theologians had become 
strangely silent. It was rumoured that they now agreed that they 
may have been mistaken about what life was really all about ....
-0O0-
Why should we interest ourselves in the question 'What is life?' 
Because we regard life as something vital, deep and of great 
importance, surely. Theories on how human beings first came into 
existence, and on the phenomena of birth, life and death, are 
bound to interest us; they also shape our views of what we are 
and wish to be, and thus profoundly affect our lives. Through 
the ages the concept of life has always been a central topic in 
theoretical contexts and if we go back in history we find 
numerous great thinkers who had important ideas about life, 
existence and being.
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'Life' is a multifaceted concept. It has various meanings, 
depending on the context in which it is used. The question 'What 
is life?' could relate to the origins of cosmic life, to problems 
concerning the period from birth to death, to the actions or 
fortunes of individuals, to various forms of life, to the 
distinction between conscious and unconscious life, 
transcendental life, to the meaning of our lives, to the survival 
of the human species, and so forth.
For present purposes I shall investigate some of the more 
important issues raised by the question, 'What is life?' and the 
theories which form the basis of the various answers. I shall 
argue that questions about life posed within the context of 
empirical science are dependent for their answers on available 
scientific evidence - that is all we have to go by - and ques­
tions on the non-empirical level are by their nature of a 
different order and thus require different answers.
1 THE QUESTION 'WHAT IS LIFE?' IN A SCIENTIFIC CONTEXT
The world in which we exist gives us the living and the nonliving 
(Thiirkauf 1980:351), and in the course of ordinary daily life we 
have no difficulty in distinguishing between the living and the 
nonliving. It is only in very extraordinary circumstances that 
we would be uncertain as to whether something was alive or dead. 
We have a 'natural' ability to observe the difference between the 
living and the nonliving. This ability can also be extended and 
aided by scientific instruments which make it possible to observe 
the living and the nonliving on macro and micro levels to which 
we do not have access through our ordinary senses. Since the 
advent of the Natural Sciences, every age has had an explanation 
of the origin of life. These explanations have always carried 
weight and have usually become the point of departure for reflec­
tion on the concept of life. Current scientific progress has 
heightened expectations of finding answers to important questions 
on life, its origin, its various forms, evolutionary processes, 
and so forth.
1.1 The origin of life
Contemporary science generally explains the origin of life as 
follows:
Living beings are composed largely of molecules, called proteins, 
the complex organic compounds formed by the combination of amino 
acids. The amino acids arrange themselves in long chains in 
different orders, giving rise to an enormous number of proteins
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which have functions of support for the organism, as well as 
controlling and guiding its internal activities. Enzymes are an 
important class of proteins with catalytic properties that allow 
the development of the chemical reactions needed within the 
organism. The cellular construction of living organisms,
achieved through the manufacture of proteins, is undertaken by a 
code - a communication system within the organism - which trans­
mits the messages indicating how to construct amino acids. In 
the living cell, cytoplasm and the nucleus can be distinguished, 
the latter containing chromosomes which in turn contain genes 
substructures that carry hereditary characteristics. A gene 
again is composed of a long, linear molecule of deoxyribonucleic 
acid (DNA), made up of a chain of elementary units. DNA chains, 
appearing in pairs, form a double helix structure. A unit of the 
chain contains a character of a code and the characters, composed 
of the DNA bases, are guanine, adenine, cytosine and thymine and 
their order in the genetic chain determines genetic information. 
The mechanism of writing and reading a certain message involves 
other large molecular structures, known as ribonucleic acid (RNA) 
of different types. Without getting involved in intricate 
molecular biology, suffice it to say that the essential problem 
for those who study the origin of life is that of knowing if 
these molecular chains and this code have been put together 
according to a preordained plan, or if the process could have 
developed by itself under suitable environmental conditions. 
This is a much debated point, but today a considerable number of 
scholars are convinced that in a certain environment (like that 
of the earth billions of years ago), the phenomenon could have 
started by itself. An essential condition is that processes that 
free sufficient energy to break molecular bonds should exist in 
nature (Di Francia 1976:370). How such energy could have been 
released, and certain processes set in motion, has been explained 
by simulating earth's primitive atmosphere, thus attempting to 
show that certain natural processes give rise to complex mole­
cules, among them DNA bases (Di Francia 1976:371). Although the 
precise, detailed origins of cosmic life are still largely a 
matter of conjecture, most natural scientists accept the hypo­
thesis that life is nothing more than especially complex physics 
and chemistry.
Herbert Spencer wrote in 1862:
Life in its simplest form is the correspondence of 
certain inner physicochemical actions with certain 
outer physicochemical actions; each advance to a 
higher form of life consists in a better preservation 
of this primary correspondence by the establishment of
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other correspondences. So that, over its nominal 
nature of which we know nothing, life is definable as 
the continuous adjustment of internal relations to 
external relations.
(Spencer 1928:70)
The same sentiment was echoed by Pierre Teilhard de Chardin 
(1966:39), who claimed that the beginnings of life are lost to 
us. Life, in scientific experience, is none other than a spe­
cific effect of complex matter, 'a property in itself coextensive 
with the whole stuff of the cosmos, but perceptible to us only 
where ... complexity exceeds a certain critical value - below 
that value we cannot perceive it at all1 (Teilhard de Chardin 
1966:24).
It seems to me that the statements of natural scientists on the 
origin of life are descriptions of primitive forms of life, or 
life in action as encountered for example on the microbiological 
level. These statements should not be taken as explanatory 
statements of the origin of the complex molecules, DNA bases, and 
so forth.
1.2 Life as a force versus life as physicochemical processes
Another option would, of course, be to conceive of life as a 
synthetic force of a higher order than that of physicochemical 
forces, a force which would influence the physicochemical causes 
without disturbing their functions. Most scientists reject this 
idea on the grounds that should such an intelligible causality or 
power bring about life or influence the steps in evolution, then 
it should be empirically verifiable. If that were possible, this 
force would be on the same empirical level as the physicochemical 
forces, which would of course rob it of a higher status:
Many scientists ... argue as follows: either this
intelligible causality to which you appeal has some 
influence upon each step of evolution, or it does not. 
If it does, then it should be empirically verifiable. 
In that case, it is an empirical causality, on the same 
level as the others. If it does not, how can it have 
any influence upon life or evolution as a whole?
(Donceel 1967:52)
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Those who argue for a higher-level force claim that its working 
has the character of becoming, being, vanishing and returning. 
It is difficult to conceive of a force which cannot be identified 
in the usual manner and the workings of which cannot be checked.
We can legitimately claim that the practice of chemistry and 
physics is something other than nature itself. Chemistry and 
physics are the results of our reflection on nature; they embody 
our thinking on, and our descriptions of, nature. The practice 
of chemistry and physics, it is argued, is in itself nothing 
chemical or physical. Rather, chemistry and physics are objects 
of inquiry; they come about through human thinking on nature 
according to a very definite hypothesis. Chemistry and physics 
cannot be understood physicochemically! To understand physics 
and chemistry one needs to reflect on chemistry and physics and 
this act is more than just a physicochemical process (Thiirkauf 
1980:352-353).
1.3 Experimentation, mechanism and hypotheses
Clearly, then, natural scientists depend greatly on experimen­
tation and factual evidence for their theories about the possible 
origin of life. The empirical criteria for life would roughly be 
its cellular constitution, that is, the build-up of cells, 
metabolism of some kind, unstable equilibrium, some sort of 
organisation, and eventual death.
Scientists are often accused by philosophers of having a mecha­
nistic world view:
Mechanism holds that life is some kind of material 
energy, or the result of a combination of material 
energies; that it can be explained, or will eventually 
be explained, by the laws of physics and chemistry; 
that a living being is only a complicated machine.
(Donceel 1967:44)
There are many variations of the mechanistic model, one such 
recent attempt to integrate mankind with nature being the so- 
called Gaia hypothesis put forward by J E Lovelock. The Gaia 
hypothesis states that life is not governed by physical events, 
but that life itself is the guiding principle which makes and 
remakes its own environment.
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Life reacts to global and cosmic crises, such as 
increasing radiation from the sun or the appearance for 
the first time of oxygen in the atmosphere, and dynami­
cally responds to insure its own preservation such that 
the crises are endured or negated.
(Sagan & Margulis 1984:61)
According to this theory no unknown external forces need be 
invoked to account for the origin or the continuance of life; 
temperature regulation, for example, becomes a consequence of the 
well-known properties of life's responsiveness and growth, 
whereas other theories wrongly state temperature regulation as a 
prerequisite for life. The Gaia hypothesis thus reverses the 
whole process - it is not that something invokes life, but rather 
that life itself invokes; for example, life continually synthe­
sises and removes the gases necessary for its own survival. 
'Life controls the composition of the reactive atmospheric gases' 
(Sagan & Margulis 1984:67). Sagan & Margulis (1984:66) also 
claim that 'The Gaia hypothesis says in essence that the entire 
earth functions as a massive machine or responsive organism'.
In science, 'mechanism' covers a great deal. The concept is used 
to describe almost any system, some of whose elements act upon 
the others. Mechanism has today more defenders than ever before 
among physicists, biologists and philosophers - especially in the 
form of the thesis that man is a computer. Suffice it to say 
that the doctrine that man is a machine or computer is unsatis­
factory, because it regards man and the world as a closed physi­
cal system '... whether a strictly deterministic system or a 
system in which whatever is not strictly determined is simply due 
to chance: according to such a world view human creativeness and
human freedom can only be illusions' (Popper 1972:254). Popper 
(1972:219) explicitly states:
By a physically closed system I mean a set or system of 
physical entities, such as atoms or elementary par­
ticles or physical forces or field of forces, which 
interact with each other - and only with each other 
in accordance with definite laws of interaction that do 
not leave any room for interaction with, or inter­
ference by, anything outside that closed set or system 
of physical entities. It is this 'closure' of the 
system that creates the deterministic nightmare.
It is especially by using certain scientific methods that biology 
has been able to examine the lower forms of life, working from 
the higher forms of life to the lower. It is at the level of an
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elementary form of life that experimentation often becomes 
controversial, because much of the work is hypothetical. Hypo­
theses are proposed and thought experiments become the modus 
operandi. The empirical situation usually forces on us the 
hypothesis that we eventually accept. How do we choose between 
hypothesis A and hypothesis B? Both may initially have strong 
evidence to support them. However, as we gain more knowledge 
about nature and more and more observations begin to favour 
hypothesis B, it will become increasingly difficult to maintain 
hypothesis A and we may reach a stage where we are prepared to 
abandon it. This is practice, but the problem arises when our 
experimentation prompts us to hypothesise about the probability 
of one thing happening rather than the other on the level where 
we do not (and for a long time yet may not) have sufficient 
knowledge or adequate grounds for accepting one hypothesis in 
preference to another. By this I mean that our experimentation 
on this 'uncertain level' could lead us to the hypothesis that 
things happened in that particular way, and not in any other, or 
our reasoning could even lead to a prediction that things are 
going to happen in a certain way in future, excluding other 
possibilities. In view of the foregoing I want to claim that 
although experimentation has shown that physicochemical processes 
are necessary for sustaining life, it does of course not mean 
that they are sufficient, or that there is enough evidence for 
accepting that life, as we know it, is only a physicochemical 
process.
2 THE QUESTION 'WHAT IS LIFE?' IN A PHILOSOPHICAL CONTEXT
2.1 World-views and empiricism
Science is not so pure or so exclusive that it is practised in 
complete isolation. Nothing is ever done in isolation. Where 
science is practised, it is always done within a specific con­
text. 'Facts are not gathered in a vacuum, but to fill gaps in a 
world-picture which already exists. And the shape of this 
world-picture depends deeply on the motives for forming it in the 
first place' (Midgley 1985:2). Personal opinions, distortion of 
facts, indiscriminately collected information, strong preferences 
and so forth often distort our theories and lead to unbalanced 
world-views. Philosophers, scientists and theologians are all to 
blame, because they do not always have the background, insight or 
flexibility to detect possible alternatives or errors.
The fear of distortion has compelled certain philosophers to 
adhere to a strict form of empiricism, even advocating that the 
place of philosophy is within the realm of the natural sciences. 
One such philosopher is W van Orman Quine (cf Quine 1984) who
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argues that we should accept the external world as it is given. 
In his philosophy of natural realism Quine is not interested in 
ontology, but in structure. The truth about nature is to be 
discovered by looking to the stimulatory input of sense data 
through the triggering of our nerve endings and our subsequent 
output - that is, our claims to knowledge - which he labels as 
the descriptions of faraway things and the theories of the inner 
workings of nature. All we can really do is analyse the descrip­
tive use of language. He then proceeds to distinguish various 
types of sentences - observation sentences and standing 
sentences.
Science ... is about regular occurrence, or what Quine 
calls 'standing sentences'. The connection comes in 
observation categoricals in which one finds a whenever 
or wherever construction, as in 'Where there's smoke 
there's fire'. Here is the beginning of rudimentary 
science. Scientific theory is the distinction between 
true and false observation categoricals .... All 
evidence stems from sensory stimulation and enters 
language through observation sentences ....
(Rouner 1984:2)
This type of approach is favoured by many contemporary philoso­
phers who prefer to stay away from ontological questions and 
rather focus on the network of the logical implications of our 
observation sentences which in turn result from sensory stimula­
tion .
2.2 An existential interpretation
A different philosophical approach is for example that of Hans 
Jonas (1982) who offers an 'existential' interpretation of 
biological facts. He claims:
... scientific biology, by its rules confined to the
physical outward facts, must ignore the dimension of 
inwardness that belongs to life: in so doing, it
submerges the distinction of 'animate' and 'inanimate'.
A new reading of the biological record may recover the 
inner dimension - that which we know best - for the
understanding of things organic and so reclaim for the
psychophysical unity of life that place in the
theoretical scheme which it had lost through the divorce 
of the material and mental since Descartes.
(Jonas 1966:IX)
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Jonas seeks to break through the anthropocentric confines of 
idealist and existentialist philosophy, as well as through the 
materialist confines of natural science.
Although my tools are, for the most part, critical 
analysis and phenomenological description, I have not 
shied away, toward the end, from metaphysical speculation 
where conjecture on ultimate and undemonstrable (but by 
no means, therefore, meaningless) matters seem called 
for.
(Jonas 1966:X)
Philosophers such as Jonas vehemently attack dualistic 
world-views which regard humans as consisting of the 
interrelation of two different entities, body and soul, thus 
splitting reality into self and the world, mind and body, inner 
and outer existence, and so forth. The notion of separate 
spheres of spirit and matter entrenches on the one hand the view 
that matter can be without spirit and on the other hand the 
opposing viewpoint that spirit can be without matter.
Suffice it to say that philosophers who concern themselves with 
the origin of life and the question of what human life consists 
of, how it is to be explained, and what comprises man, usually 
end up in one of the two mainstreams of thought on these matters 
- psychophysical monism or psychophysical dualism.
2.3 Life, death and the soul
I believe that, in posing the question of what life is, the very 
fact of death is brought to mind. In the Homeric age it was held 
that man passes away as leaves fall from a branch, that there is 
no life to come. The doctrine of the soul had not yet been 
developed and if some afterlife existed, it was at best shadowy 
and unconscious. The cycle of the seasons, night following day, 
and death following life, were all seen as the natural order of 
things - so we should eat, drink and be merry. The Orphic 
religion taught that the body is the tomb of the soul 
(soma-sema), thus offering a dualistic answer to the problem of 
death. Life (the soul) is alien to the body and needs eventually 
to be liberated from its tomb. Plato was the first to offer a 
scientific justification for the belief in the soul. According 
to Plato, souls - like common-sense people - are substances, and 
the soul, for various reasons - such as the fact that it is the 
principle of life - is also immortal. Aristotle, on the other 
hand, regarded a soul simply as the form of the organisation of
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the body and in view of this it would be unacceptable to suggest 
that it might survive death. The Christian religion extended and 
entrenched the dualist notion of body and soul, the emphasis on 
present life (being alive, existing) as such. Although the 
Christian religion and other religions did have laws against 
killing, the preservation of life or the extension of life for 
the sake of life itself, was something of minor importance.
At the peak of the dualistic movement, in Gnosticism, 
the soma-sema simile, in its origin purely human, had 
come to extend to the physical universe. The whole 
world is tomb (prison house, place of exile, etc) to 
the soul or spirit, that alien injection of what is 
otherwise unrelated to life. There, one might be 
tempted to say, the matter rests to this day - with the 
difference that the tomb has meanwhile become empty.
(Jonas 1966:14)
Dualism was finally elevated to a dogma by Cartesianism. The 
world was regarded as a vast machine, the Creator being the 
clockmaker. The universe functioned according to the general 
laws of mechanics. During the seventeenth and eighteenth century 
this view was generally accepted and history had to wait for 
evolutionism to rediscover the concept of life.
Evolutionism, however, regards this given type of 
structure, the condition for a specific performance of 
life, as itself a product of life, the outcome and 
temporary stopping-place of a continuous dynamism which 
itself must be termed 'life'. Thus life appears in its 
very means, that is, in its structural equipment for 
living, as its own achievement, or at least result, 
instead of being simply endowed with its means and 
faculties. This is one of the most far-reaching 
discoveries ever made with regard to the nature of 
life.
(Jonas 1966:45)
2.4 Philosophies of life
The deterministic outlook on life prevailing in science before 
the twentieth century provoked protest from a number of thinkers 
who, in their writings, propagated the right to life, the worth 
of the human person, and spiritual values. There were three 
prominent movements in philosophy which generated new interest in 
the phenomenon of life and related matters:
(a) The philosophy of life
These philosophers were actualists who emphasised movement 
becoming life. Their conception of reality was an organic one. 
Biology was given high priority and their method was strictly 
empirical. Pluralism and personalism were strong trends within 
the movement. Important exponents of this trend were Henri 
Bergson, Wilhelm Dilthey and William James.
(b) The philosophy of existence
Philosophies of existence also contributed greatly to a renewed 
interest in the phenomenon of life (Kierkegaard, Heidegger, 
Jaspers, Marcel, Sartre, etc). Although it is extremely diffi­
cult to exactly define philosophies of existence, for present 
purposes suffice it to say that these philosophers attempted to 
see man in his totality and they reflected on problems such as 
the possibility of human life, subjectivity, the meaning of life 
and death, and other particular human experiences.
The following extracts from Jose Ortega y Gasset's Some lessons 
in metaphysics captures the mood of the age of the philosophies 
of existence: 'Life is what we do and what happens to us ...' 
(Ortega y Gasset 1969:36), 'Our life is what we are doing now 
...' (1969:37), 'all living is one's own living ...' (1969:38), 
'... all living is a living with, a finding oneself, in the midst 
of a circumstance, a surrounding ...' (1969:40). 'Life is thrown 
at us, or we are thrown into it - but the life we are given is a 
problem which we ourselves must resolve' (1969:41). 'To live is 
to be continually deciding what we are going to do' (1969:43). 
'Life is decision' (1969:57). '... our life is most of all a 
colliding with the future .... Life is an activity pointed toward 
the future; we find the present as the past afterward, in 
relation to the future' (1969:45).
(c) The philosophy of being
These philosophers confined themselves mostly to the analysis of 
being. They offered philosophies of nature, a philosophy of man 
and so forth. Of the more important figures in this movement 
were Alfred North Whitehead, George Santayana, Nicolai Hartmann 
and the Thomists.
One should of course also not underrate the influence of new 
movements in sociology and psychology which overcame mechanistic 
materialism in favour of a more humanistic approach.
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2.5 The ethical life
Clearly, then, there is also the other type of philosopher who 
does not concern himself with the origins of man, the body-mind 
problem, the status of the mind, the possibility of introspection 
and so forth, but is interested in the question of ends. The 
concept of life is studied in its broader context - and themes 
such as the following come into play: forms of life, living
responsibly, interpretations or views of life, the value of life, 
and the quality of life. The concept of life is studied in its 
broader application, for example in ethical systems, where the 
'value of life' principle is of great importance. A prerequisite 
for any ethical system is the existence of living human beings. 
'It is perhaps the most basic and necessary principle of ethics, 
since empirically speaking, there can be no ethics whatsoever 
without living human beings. This principle can be stated in 
several ways, but I prefer to state it as follows: "Human beings
should revere life and accept death"' (Thiroux 1986:124). The 
principle stated by Thiroux has two components. Firstly, there 
is the reverence for life. The foregoing analysis - whatever 
one's point of view about the origin of life and of how different 
forms of life (including the life of man) are to be explained 
clearly shows modern man's concern and interest in the phenomenon 
of life.
Today most cultures revere life and have strict rules prohibiting 
killing, although some allow killing under special circumstances. 
Prohibitions against killing are found in Judaeo-Christian 
ethics, Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam and in the ethical codes of 
humanism. Although some systems do allow killing under special 
circumstances, it can safely be suggested that in contemporary 
cultures, with the possible exception of a few small primitive 
groups, preserving and extending human life is a common goal. In 
most contemporary cultures the preservation and protraction of 
life are desirable under normal circumstances. It is argued that 
life is a basic possession, the one thing that all humans have in 
common, although of course each human life is unique and can 
never be exactly duplicated. That a living human being has life 
is an empirical fact which is universally accepted. What is to 
be done with that life, how it is to be used, whether in certain
circumstances it can or should be terminated, are all matters of
a different kind. How we argue about these issues would also
reflect the worth or value we place on our lives and the lives of 
others.
The ethical dimensions of our beliefs, attitudes, actions and 
policies regarding the begetting, sustenance, protection, manipu­
lation and improvement of life are especially the concern of
bioethics, which means 'life ethics'. This includes the ethics
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of sexuality, population and birth control, fertilisation, 
abortion, sterilisation, genetics, birth, health care, human 
experimentation and informed consent, organ transplantation, the 
treatment of dying patients, mercy killing, truth-telling and 
confidentiality in medicine, and related matters such as the 
right to live and the right to die. Ethical problems arising in 
areas such as medicine, business, law and ecology have caused 
renewed interest in ethics, not only on the theoretical level, 
but also as something which should be applied to human affairs in 
a very practical way. I believe that the ethical issues that 
have arisen have served as a great stimulus in our time and have 
generated new interest in the implementation of applied ethics.
3 THE QUESTION 'WHAT IS LIFE?' IN A THEOLOGICAL CONTEXT
3.1 Scientific facts and theological theories
Philosophers and theologians cannot ignore the information which 
the natural sciences offer regarding the origin of the cosmos, 
the origin of forms of life and especially that of human beings. 
Discoveries in the natural sciences and theories put forward by 
natural scientists have important implications for philosophy and 
theology alike.
Wolfhart Pannenberg (1981:4) expresses the following opinion:
If the God of the Bible is creator of the universe, 
then it is not possible to understand fully or even 
appropriately the processes of nature without any 
reference to that God. If, on the contrary, nature can 
be appropriately understood without reference to the 
God of the Bible, then that God cannot be the creator 
of the universe, and consequently he could not be truly 
God and could not be trusted as a source of moral 
teaching either.
I do not think that theologians can ignore indisputable evidence 
concerning man and his origin, whatever the content of this 
evidence may be. It is often argued that scientific evidence 
which in the past was offered as indisputable has often turned 
out to be questionable or false. There are writers who warn 
against accepting everything science offers at face value. Mary 
Midgley (1985:11) contends that:
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The point I am currently making about the idea of 'the 
universe' as a whole is that, if one means by it not 
much more than is already described in scientific 
books, one is less likely to be deeply impressed with 
its vastness and mystery than if one regards those 
books as small mirrors reflecting only parts of its 
more superficial aspects.
The ideal would, of course, be for scientific, philosophical and 
theological theories of life to coincide. The fact is that they 
do often clash, but this is because of the confusion created by 
each attempting to understand the other from its own point of 
view. The foregoing analysis has clearly shown that the concept 
of life is not only to be considered on the factual level, but it 
also concerns the meaning we attach to these facts. We order our 
experiences of life in a certain way, and their meanings are 
consistent with a certain system which we usually describe as our 
world-view. Facts, our interpretation of them and the meaning we 
attach to them, all form an interconnected whole. Facts about 
the origin of human life are at one end of the scale, whereas the 
meaning we attach to our lives is at the other end, where faith 
operates - the sense of our life having a plan within a whole 
greater than ourselves. And these two ends of the scale are on 
different levels - facts and values are of a different order.
John Hick (1976:46-47) wrote:
This emphasis upon human potentiality completes an 
important shift of emphasis in theological anthropology 
from the question of origins to the question of ends.
It is not what man has come from but what he is going 
to that is important. We must assume that the picture 
being built up by the natural sciences of the origin of 
man, both individually and as a species, is basically 
correct and is progressively becoming more adequate and 
accurate as research continues. According to this 
picture, life on this planet began with natural chemi­
cal reactions occurring under the influence of radia­
tions falling upon the earth's surface. Thus began the 
long, slow evolution of the forms of life, a process 
which has eventually produced man. And each human 
individual comes about through the partially random 
selection of a specific genetic code out of the vir­
tually infinite range of possibilities contained even 
in the portion of genetic material lodged in his 
parents. This is, in broadest outline, the picture of 
man's beginning as it emerges from the physicists', 
chemists' and biologists' researches. And Christianity
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does not offer a different or rival account of our 
human origins. It says, in its hebraic myth of man's 
genesis, that he has been created out of the dust of 
the earth; but the details of the creative process, 
from dust to the immensely complex religious and 
valuing human animal, are for the relevant sciences to 
trace.
3.2 The rediscovery of the present self
Man's quest for meaningfulness is what Hick describes as 'what he 
is going to'. Philosophies of being, of existence and of life 
have also influenced theology where the emphasis has shifted away 
from the preoccupation with man's eternal soul (as life here­
after) to the existing human self, man in his concrete existence 
here and now.
It has for many years been fashionable amongst theologians, 
influenced by the life philosophies, to describe life as a 
mystery. They claimed human life to be totally different from 
any other form of life. Man was regarded as an exception in the 
world of living creatures. They argued as follows: Man is aware
of and awaits his own death. But no other organism dies as man 
dies, because in life man is aware of his own approaching death 
and what he loses by dying. He can understand and explain the 
death of an organism, the disintegration of living structures or 
his relations into what remains after death has set in, but man 
cannot explain what it is for the 'I', the 'person', to die. In 
this sense death is a mystery. Of one thing we are certain - our 
own death - but it has been argued that 'personhood' sets humans 
apart from other living creatures, thus making human life and 
death unique. Knowing about death is also simultaneously a 
non-knowing - death, like life, is also a mystery (cf Brunner 
1965:107f).
Much of contemporary thinking on life centres on the meaning­
fulness of man in an everyday context.
To say that human beings have a soul is to say that 
they can do various things. ... I [have] enumerated 
their ability to think, hope, love, speak, perceive, 
etc. These are all things which human beings do. The 
category of action is, in this way, internal to that of 
having a soul. To say that human beings have a soul is 
to say that they have a capacity or ability to perform 
actions. The soul simply is this capacity for action 
which human beings have.
(Cooke 1986:270)
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This type of argument leads to the following claim:
When the human being dies, his body decays and ceases 
to be the foundation for spatial and temporal predi­
cations of the human being. Can the human being still 
exist and be the subject of activities attributable to 
him because of the capacity for activity which is the 
soul? I do not see any metaphysical or logical reason 
why this should be impossible ....
(Cooke 1986:274)
The emphasis is on the quest for a meaningful life. Human life 
as such has come to be regarded as extremely important; it is to 
be respected and even prolonged, if possible. The individual and 
society should both work toward the goal of making every human 
life a meaningful one. The idea of the life of the eternal soul 
has now become the idea of the moral life as responsible and 
meaningful. The life of the self has been rediscovered. Life 
for the contemporary religious individual means to be the respon­
sible, the understanding self living as a social 
in-response-relationship-to-other-selves (cf Niebuhr 1963).
Some of the important issues in religious life at this point in 
time are: In terms of which symbols should we interpret reli­
gious life? What is the correct form and character of Christian 
life? How does it differ from other styles of human existence 
and action? To what other life styles is it closely related? 
Which is the best possible way to make sense of life? How can I 
give meaning to my own life and that of others?
4 THE FUTURE?
Spectacular progress in the natural sciences has confronted 
philosophers and theologians with new challenges. On the other 
hand it must be stated that the metaphysical controversies are 
still very much the same. Although new arguments have been put 
forward, none of the major metaphysical questions has an answer 
yet that is agreed upon. Philosophical contributions (other than 
metaphysical) to the general question 'What is life?' - with all 
its subsidiary offshoots and problems - lies on the level of the 
conceptual. Progress in this area means new ways of thinking 
about perennial problems, new descriptions and the development of 
alternative philosophical vocabularies. It is especially in this 
last area where much work needs to be done. The existing vocabu­
laries have become outdated.
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And what about the contribution of theology? Recently theolo­
gians have been under strong pressure to demonstrate the credibi­
lity and contribution of theology to areas of research such as 
bioethics. The burning question is: Can theology make a 
significant contribution to bioethics in general? (cf Shelp
1985). The question reaches even further: Can theologians offer 
a significant contribution towards the question 'What is life?', 
with its many ramifications? I think that ongoing discoveries in 
science and the application of new techniques in various fields, 
together with the development of innovative philosophical 
theories and vocabularies, will in future generate controversial 
and radically new thinking in theology as well.
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D I  FERREIRA Genetic
engineering 
in life
The scope of modern genetic engineering is discussed in suffi­
cient detail to allow the reader to gain a perception of the 
'creative activities' it entails. Examples of genetic engi­
neering (mainly in agriculture) are presented, as well as the 
dangers and fears which accompany such activities. Finally, 
reference is made to the ethical dilemmas relating to genetic 
engineering in living organisms.
1 INTRODUCTION
Genetic engineering - alteration of the genetic components of 
organisms - has been practised in an elementary form in agri­
culture for millennia, as plants and animals are selected to 
favour desired qualities. The fundamental laws of inheritance 
formulated by Mendel (1866) form the basis of modern plant and 
animal breeding. Traditional breeding involves the introduction 
of desirable traits and the elimination of undesirable genetic 
traits through natural mating and selection of suitable offspring 
(Council for Agricultural Science and Technology 1986 = CAST
1986). The new genetic engineering was triggered by Watson and 
Crick's discovery in 1953 of the double helix structure of 
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA).
2 MODERN GENETIC ENGINEERING
Modern genetic engineering allows scientists to make precise 
changes in genetic material, that is, DNA (deoxyribonucleic 
acid). Like a magnetic tape, DNA stores information in the cell
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which directs each phase of development of the individual. The 
information in DNA is stored in the form of long strings of 
sequences of four small molecules, in which the order of occur­
rence of the basic molecular units may differ from one sequence 
to the next (CAST 1986). The term 'gene' is given to the region 
in a DNA molecule that gives rise to a particular genetic 
character. It is now possible to exploit particular enzymes to 
cut DNA and isolate genes or other segments of DNA which are of 
interest; this DNA can then be introduced into another organism 
or it can be modified before reintroducing it into the same or a 
different organism (Davies 1987). All this has already been done 
and a few examples will be given later on. This technology is 
also called recombinant DNA (rDNA) and, in addition to other 
advantages, it makes it possible to introduce desired genes from 
exotic sources which would otherwise be impossible.
Thus genes can be transferred between different plants such as 
tobacco and maize, or different animals like rats and pigs; 
genes from microorganisms can also be introduced into plants and 
animals. It is this fact, especially if the transfer and elimi­
nation of human genes, or both are considered, which poses the 
first ethical question. To answer this question the objectives 
of genetic engineering will have to be stated and evaluated.
3 THE OBJECTIVES OF GENETIC ENGINEERING
The ultimate aim of scientists employing the technology of 
genetic engineering is to create a 'product' to improve the 
quality of life of all people, directly or indirectly. It is, 
however, debatable whether this statement is always valid. If 
not, genetic engineering becomes a question of morality.
How can this technology indeed improve the quality of life of all 
people? The umbrella goals of genetic engineering can be 
summarised as follows:
* The improvement of crop production.
* The improvement of animal production.
* The improvement of health care for humans.
It may occur to the reader that these goals are defined in very 
general terms, but each entails a large number of diverse acti­
vities and secondary goals. In the African context genetic 
engineering means increasing food production to feed the starving 
population through plants and animals that have become better 
adapted. Between six and seven million children under the age of 
five probably died in Africa during 1985, many of them in the
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areas of greatest food scarcity (Joseph 1985). In any given 
year, some four to five million children die in Africa from the 
combination of causes that is responsible for death associated 
with famine (Joseph 1985). In many cases they die from the 
synergetic effect of malnutrition and infectious disease, and 
genetic engineering can therefore make an important contribution 
to health care.
Genetic engineering can therefore be regarded simply as a 'tool' 
to achieve specific aims. The moral and ethical dilemmas relate 
to the means of achieving these aims. A greater understanding of 
the principles involved in genetic engineering can be reached if 
specific examples are studied.
4 GENETIC ENGINEERING IN LIVING ORGANISMS
4.1 Genetic engineering in crop improvement
According to Goodman (1985),
Improvement in world agriculture ultimately depends on 
a combination of improved farming practices, the 
availability of supplies to allow farmers to grow their 
crops, the accessibility of markets and the means to 
move produce to the market. Plant breeding continues 
to be the applied scientific discipline that delivers 
improved genetic traits for use by farmers. Genetic 
engineering will make its contribution in the near- to 
medium-term in improvements that will reduce input 
costs, reduce risks, reduce losses after planting or 
harvest, increase quality, and increase market value.
The application of genetic engineering to plants is possible 
because of the ability to regenerate whole plants from plant 
parts, to use Agrobacterium, nature's own genetic engineer, to 
transfer selected genes into the plant genome (the genetic 
library of an organism); other techniques are also used for 
direct gene transfer. With the rapid development of the techno­
logy for genetic engineering in plants, it is worthwhile examin­
ing some of the possibilities for its implementation.
4.1.1 Herbicide resistance
Weeds cause a serious reduction in the yield of crop plants and 
herbicides are therefore commonly applied to control weeds. 
Apart from the high costs involved, some herbicides may damage 
crops. The first useful gene transferred to plants was a gene
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which imparted tolerance to glyphosate (a potent broad-spectrum 
herbicide which inhibits the growth of both weed and crop 
species). This gene was isolated from a bacterium (Salmonella 
typhimurium) and transferred to plants such as the petunia, 
tobacco and the tomato (Shah et al 1986; Fillatti et al 1987). 
Resistance to Atrazine (another herbicide) has also been incorpo­
rated into plants by analogous procedures (Davies 1987). Incor­
poration of these genes into crop plants therefore allows farmers 
to use these herbicides in the control of weeds without damaging 
the plants. Useful genes have thus been transferred from 
microorganisms to plants!
4.1.2 Disease resistance
Improving plants' resistance to disease is one of the more 
lucrative areas of genetic engineering. Plant disease is disrup­
tive and, at times, catastrophic. For instance, late blight (a 
disease resulting from an infection by a fungal pathogen) caused 
the starvation of one million people and forced the emigration of 
another two million to North America, owing to its decimation of 
the potato crop in the Irish potato famine of 1845-1860 (Jaynes, 
Xanthopoulos, Destefano-Beltran & Dodds 1987). Attempts are 
being made to isolate genes for coding disease resistance from 
some plants and transferring them to other crop plants. The most 
novel approaches, however, are those in which genes for 
resistance to disease are isolated from insects and transferred 
to plants.
Certain insects have the ability to produce bactericidal 
proteins. One of these insects is the silk moth Hyalophora 
cecropia) in which the pupae respond to bacterial infection by 
the synthesis of from 15-20 antibacterial proteins (Dodds & 
Jaynes 1987). Some of these proteins like lysozyme, the antibac­
terial protein also found in egg white and human tears, were 
purified. Genes which code for the production of these proteins 
were very recently transferred to potatoes to combat diseases 
such as Erwinia and Pseudomonas (Dodds 1987).
4.1.3 Pest resistance
Like diseases, pests can also impair agricultural productivity. 
Biological control of insects is an increasingly attractive 
alternative to chemical insecticides which are believed to be 
extremely hazardous to the environment and humans, owing to their 
toxicity and even carcinogenicity (Carlton & Gonzales 1986).
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The best known example of biological control is the use of a 
bacterium, Bacillus thuringiensis, which has been marketed as a 
biological insecticide for more than twenty years (National 
Research Council 1987 = NRC 1987). It produces an endotoxin 
which is a potent insecticide for certain pests. Initially, the 
gene which codes for the production of this toxin was transferred 
to another bacterium (Pseudomonas fluocescens) which colonises 
corn roots. This genetically engineered organism is freeze-dried 
and coated on seeds before planting, and it is therefore able to 
kill certain pests including the black cutworm - an important 
maize pest (NRC 1987). An even more novel approach is to 
transfer this ability to plants. The gene was successfully 
transferred to tobacco (Vaeck et al 1987). Larvae that were 
feeding on the genetically altered plants became paralysed after 
forty-eight hours and died within three days. The gene has also 
been transferred to tomatoes (Fischhoff et al 1987) while 
attempts are being made to transfer it to potatoes.
4.1.4 The use of microorganisms
Microorganisms in the environment affect the growth of plants in 
a variety of ways and can be either beneficial or harmful. The 
problem of disease has already been discussed. However, while 
some microorganisms protect plants from bacterial and fungal 
infection, others protect them from environmental stresses such 
as acidity, salinity, or high concentrations of toxic metals. 
Still others attack weeds that compete with crops. The best 
known association between microorganisms and plants is the 
symbiotic relationship between nitrogen-fixing bacteria of the 
genus Rhizobium and members of the legume family, such as soya 
beans (NRC 1987).
The first development which has progressed to the point of field 
testing involves genetically altered bacteria designed to prevent 
frost damage. Pseudomonas syringae is a bacterial species with 
many members that are normally harmless and commonly inhabit the 
outer surface of plant cells. However, some of these bacteria 
contain a protein that initiates the formation of ice crystals at 
temperatures below freezing. The growing ice crystals can 
rupture and damage plant cells. If the bacteria are not present 
plants can withstand colder temperatures without damage (NRC
1987). The gene that makes the protein was identified and 
removed from the organism (Lindow et al 1982). The so-called 
'ice-minus' strain was thereby developed. In laboratory and 
field tests, plants sprayed with this strain could withstand 
frost conditions. The ice-minus strain replaces the wild strain 
and provides the crop with some measure of frost protection. Due
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to public apprehension, based on a lack of understanding and 
confusion over the types of precautions needed to regulate its 
release into the environment, it took approximately five years 
before approval was granted to conduct field trials. This was 
the first case in which a genetically engineered microorganism 
was tested outside the laboratory.
Another novel but quite different approach involves the common 
firefly (Photinus pyralis). When scientists transfer genes from 
one organism to another it is very difficult to tell whether the 
gene is actually transferred. In most cases this can only be 
tested in the mature plant. Scientists therefore make use of 
'marker' genes. These genes code for a product, such as resis­
tance to an antibiotic, and their transfer can be detected at a 
very early stage if the cells are cultured on a medium containing 
the antibiotic. These 'marker' genes are transferred together 
with the other wanted gene. Ow and his co-workers (1986) iso­
lated the luciferase gene in fireflies, which encodes an enzyme 
that catalyses light-producing luciferin. This gene was trans­
ferred to carrots and tobacco and the light emitted by luciferase 
was detected in the plants!
4.2 Genetic engineering in animals
For centuries, people have sought to improve animal productivity 
by selecting and breeding only the best animals. Breeders have 
sought to develop animals that grow bigger, produce more, provide 
leaner products of a better quality, use resources more effi­
ciently, or show increased fecundity or resistance to disease and 
stress (NRC 1987). Techniques such as artificial insemination 
and embryo transfer date back to 1782 and 1890 respectively 
(Steane 1985). These techniques have revolutionised animal 
breeding in this century while the next important advance in 
animal husbandry will result from combining conventional breeding 
methods with genetic engineering. Although the technology of 
gene transfer in animals is still in its infancy, a number of 
notable successes have already been achieved. Some of these 
achievements will be described briefly.
4.2.1 Animal breeding
Gene transfer between mammalian cells by somatic cell hybridisa­
tion was achieved in the 1960s. Owing to the fact that an animal 
can only result from the development of a fertilised egg, the 
transfer of genes to single cells is of use only in gene mapping. 
The transfer of genes to fertilised egg cells has been achieved 
both in a number of laboratory species and in cattle (NRC 1987).
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Rat growth hormone genes were transferred to mice resulting in 
larger body size and this characteristic was also transmitted to 
their progeny (Palmitter et al 1982). Hammer and others (1985) 
reported the production of transgenic rabbits, sheep and pigs. 
The isolation and transfer of the so-called Booroola gene is 
being attempted. This gene is found in Australian merino sheep 
and it boosts the incidence of twinning and triplets, giving an 
overall 20-40% increase in the number of lambs weaned (NRC 1987). 
Scientists may attempt to transfer this gene to other valuable 
livestock species once it can be isolated and transferred.
Although the science of pisciculture (fish farming) is relatively 
young, genetic engineering has already been applied to fish 
production. The fertilised eggs can easily be manipulated to 
change the chromosome numbers, leading to bigger fish. The sex 
of the fish can also be regulated, which is an advantage because 
female fish are preferred for commercial markets (NRC 1987). 
Attempts are being made to isolate an 'antifreeze' gene from 
Antartic fish and transfer it to other fish species, which will 
allow more species to tolerate low temperatures.
4.2.2 Vaccines against disease
The development of vaccines through genetic engineering holds 
great potential. The first of these vaccines was Omnivac, which 
immunises pigs against pseudorabies. This disease infects about 
10% of the four million pigs in the United States and is costing 
the pork industry in that country as much as $60 million a year 
(NRC 1987). Another vaccine (for colibacillosis) was approved 
for use in Europe in 1982 (Marketing International 1984). These 
vaccines depend on cloned genes of the disease agent which are 
used to produce large quantities of certain proteins in cell 
culture. When injected into an animal as a vaccine, these 
proteins stimulate the animal's own immune system to protect it 
from infection (NRC 1987). Such vaccines can be effective, safe, 
easy to manufacture and economical to produce. Genes have been 
cloned for the surface proteins of viruses that cause fowl 
plague, influenza, vesicular stomatitis, herpes simplex, foot- 
and-mouth disease, feline leukaemia, rinderpest and rabies; 
vaccines have either been developed or experiments are leading to 
their development against these animal diseases (Van Brunt 1987).
4.2.3 Microorganisms in animal husbandry
The production of growth hormones and the modification of intes­
tinal organisms are the two fields of interest which will be 
briefly presented.
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The low cost production of large quantities of animal growth 
hormones is an exciting prospect. Bovine growth hormone (BGH) is 
a naturally occurring hormone that increases milk production in 
cows (Gagliardi 1985). Bacteria have been genetically engineered 
to produce the hormone, which when administered to lactating cows 
daily, can increase milk production by up to 40%. The animal's 
milk composition does not change, although it does require 
greater amounts of, and more nutritious, feed (NRC 1987). 
Studies are being conducted to transfer the BGH gene to animals. 
Another example is that of porcine growth hormone (PGH). This 
hormone greatly stimulates pigs' growth, elevates the growth 
rate, feed efficiency, and ratio of muscle to fat (NRC 1987). 
The PGH gene has also been cloned into bacteria, purified and 
administered to pigs by injection.
A more speculative area of interst to genetic engineers lies 
within the agricultural animals themselves. Attempts are being 
made to improve the microorganisms inside an animal to create a 
more effective, natural bioprocessing system. This research is 
still in its infancy but provides a glimpse of the far-reaching 
possibilities that lie ahead for agriculture.
4.3 Genetic engineering in humans
Genetic engineering in humans is the most controversial field of 
genetic engineering, or it has at least the potential to become 
controversial. Reports of such results as the fusion of cells 
from mouse and man (Harris & Watkins 1965) create public unease. 
The major application of genetic engineering in humans lies in 
the field of health care and this will be outlined in the follow­
ing sections.
4.3.1 Genetic engineering as a tool in diagnostics
The diagnosis of diseases is an important aspect of human health 
care. New approaches have been developed through genetic engi­
neering using DNA probe technology. A DNA probe is basically a 
piece of DNA which complements the DNA or RNA of the disease- 
causing organism. In the case of Legionnaire's disease, for 
instance, the DNA probe test can be performed on a patient's 
serum, blood, sputum, faeces or liver cells (Van Brunt 1985). 
The complementary DNA probe hybridises to a complementary nucleic 
acid sequence in the sample, which confirms the presence of the 
disease. This technology holds great potential for the rapid and 
precise diagnosis of diseases, including cancer.
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developments in this field are finally aimed at the treatment of 
serious diseases by physicians in a hospital environment. 
Several products have already been developed and are being 
marketed. These include the human growth hormone, interferons, 
human insulin (the first genetically engineered therapeutic, 
which has been on the market since 1982) and tissue plasminogen 
activator (t-PA) (Klausner 1985; Ratafia 1987).
The genes that code for the various therapeutics were cloned into 
bacteria (Escherichia coli), or mammalian cell cultures. Large 
amounts of the product can then be produced in these cultures. 
Genetically engineered E. coli is for instance used to produce 
interferons (used in cancer therapy and several other diseases), 
tumour necrosis factor (TNF, which kills some tumour cells), 
human growth hormone (for treatment of hypopituitary dwarfism) 
and interleukin-2 (IL-2, used in the treatment of cancer and 
possibly AIDS) (Klausner 1985). Mammalian cell cultures can also 
be used to produce hormones, enzymes and proteins. The best 
example is the production of t-PA, which is a revolutionary 
blood-clot dissolver used for treating heart attacks. It has 
been tested successfully and one company is working on a system 
of automatic injectors, whereby a person with a heart condition 
might be able to self-inject t-PA (Klausner 1985). Many more 
examples can be added but these should suffice to explain the 
therapeutic principles involved.
4.3.2 Genetic engineering as a tool in therapeutics
4.3.3 Gene therapy
Gene therapy which transforms human cells to treat genetical 
defects is a high-risk field of research, and strict control 
measures therefore exist (Beers & Bassett 1977). The ultimate 
goal of gene therapy is to prevent disease, not just to cure it. 
Research is still, however, focused on the genetic manipulation 
of the germ line to produce heritable changes (McCormick 1985a). 
Marrow culture and transplantation have proved successful in the 
more conventional (not genetically engineered) treatments of some 
diseases such as adenosine deaminiase (ADA) deficiency, a disease 
that produces a severe combined immune deficiency syndrome. 
Scientists are therefore attempting genetic manipulation of bone 
marrow cells. According to McCormick (1985a) '... researchers 
won't yet inject foreign DNA into a human subject. Far better to 
transfer genetic material in culture and reimplant it.'
There are certain preconditions to experimentation in human gene 
therapy (McCormick 1985a), all of which ensure the safety of the 
patient and others. The more controversial possibilities still
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lie in the future. These include germ-line modifications, where 
defective genes - in dominant diseases - are replaced, or in 
which parents homozygous for a recessive trait are determined to 
have children free of that trait. The problems associated with 
system-wide genetic change (i e a change that effects the whole 
body) are enormous and no reputable researcher is willing to take 
the responsibility for unknown effects on what might be genera­
tions of offspring (McCormick 1985a).
A final possibility of genetic engineering in humans is not to 
correct defects, but to add desirable characteristics. The 
debate on this potential has already started and it can only be 
hoped that it will never be exploited.
5 FEARS AND DANGERS
Public concern about genetic engineering has focused on two 
nightmarish scenarios. One is of genetically engineered orga­
nisms such as bacteria to which we have no resistance, escaping 
from the laboratory into the environment and causing a new 
plague. The other features arrogant scientists, always on the 
look-out for a chance to 'play God', redesigning humans in 
accordance with their own visions of excellence. None of these 
are part of the reality of our time, but there are related topics 
which should be addressed. The fears of genetic engineering in 
microorganisms, plants, animals and humans and the associated 
dangers will be dealt with briefly.
5.1 The release of genetically engineered microorganisms
When a 'new organism' is released into the environment the 
question of safety or possible danger immediately arises. The 
release of genetically engineered microorganisms into the envi­
ronment is controlled by statutory bodies in countries all over 
the world. The current approach to determine if the release of 
such an organism constitutes a hazard focuses on five questions 
(Marx 1987):
* Will the released organism survive?
* Will the organism multiply?
* Will it spread beyond its original area of application?
* Can it transfer its genetic material to other organisms?
* Will the original organism or any of those that might pick up 
its genes prove harmful?
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The risk of releasing genetically engineered microorganisms will 
therefore be assessed, case by case. As a result of uncertainty 
and the actions of environmental activists it took Steven Lindow 
and his co-workers five years to obtain approval for the field 
testing of the 'ice-minus' bacteria (McCormick 1985b; Marx 
1987). It may be concluded that the risks involved in the 
release of genetically engineered microorganisms are minimised by 
strict control measures.
5.2 Genetically engineered plants
The cultivation of genetically engineered crop plants might pose 
two environmental risks: the negative environmental effects of a 
modified genotype (genetic constitution of an individual) itself 
and the possible movement of that unique DNA to other organisms 
(Hauptli, Newell & Goodman 1985).
Weedlike tendencies are the only real environmental nuisance 
posed by a new crop variety. Careful assessment of a new plant 
in natural and agricultural environments, before introduction is 
permitted, should reveal the weedlike nature of the plant. The 
transfer of the transformed DNA from a crop species to a weed 
species may be at best impossible or, at worst, result in an 
overly persistent weed (Hauptli, Newell & Goodman 1985), espe­
cially if the transferred gene codes for herbicide tolerance. 
However, the mechanisms involved and the reproductive barriers 
separating most crop species from weeds, make such an event 
highly unlikely. These risks must nevertheless be assessed 
before permission for release is granted.
5.3 Genetically engineered animals
The environmental impact of genetically engineered vaccines is 
probably the only aspect of such vaccines that needs to be 
considered. This should not cause any ethical problems, provided 
that assessment procedures are sound enough. The transfer of a 
genetic trait from one mammalian species to the germ line of an 
unrelated mammalian species may, however, raise certain ethical 
questions. If proper attention is given to animal welfare, 
modification of the germ line of domestic animals raised for 
food, with the intention of improving their properties, may 
become ethically acceptable (Danforth & Roblin 1986).
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5.4 Genetically engineered humans
The development of therapeutics and diagnostics for human health 
care through genetic engineering causes no serious ethical 
problems, provided that strict testing for unwanted side effects 
is maintained. Even gene therapy in humans is not a contro­
versial subject if it is done through somatic cells such as bone 
marrow. The firs't ethical problem arises when germ line modifi­
cations are considered. There can be no objection if this action 
can lead to the cure or the prevention of the disease. The 
problem is that the side effects of such an action are unknown. 
This is of great importance because once the gene is inserted the 
trait becomes inheritable. The side effects will only become 
visible once the gene is inserted but the gene cannot be inserted 
before scientists are sure that it is safe. This is therefore a 
catch-22 situation.
Another ethical question involves the transfer of genetic traits 
from human beings into the germ line of another mammalian species 
or the transfer of a genetic trait from any mammalian species 
into the germ line of a human being. A lawsuit seeking to 
prohibit experiments of this type was filed in the USA (Danforth 
& Roblin 1986). Do these experiments violate ethical and moral 
standards? The debate will undoubtedly continue for many years. 
However, the insertion of genes with the aim of adding desirable 
characteristics (not to correct defects) cannot be defended on 
any ethical or moral basis.
6 CONCLUSIONS
The ultimate aim of life scientists is to improve the standard of 
living of all people. Genetic engineering can be regarded as a 
tool to achieve certain goals which could not be achieved through 
conventional approaches. The long-term possibilities created by 
genetic engineering for the production of food and the improve­
ment of human health care, make it a moral imperative that such 
research should be done, although society must be involved in its 
demarcation and application. Society's involvement should be 
based on moral and ethical principles.
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